The target architecture is the SOST Atomic Bridge: an Atomic Reserve Vault of preissued, immobilized wSOST on Ethereum, exchanged one-for-one against native SOST through atomic swaps in both directions — no mint per operation, no burn on the return, no liquidity pool. A small Gold Access Key paid in XAUT goes entirely to Gold Reserve V2 and is not part of the backing. Nothing here is live, there is no launch date, the keyless native reserve found in research (C705) needs two new SOST consensus rules that are not authorized, and any future activation is subject to security work, an external audit and legal review.
SOST does not intend to mint a new wSOST for every bridge operation. The target architecture uses a preissued, immobilized wSOST reserve and bidirectional atomic swaps. Native SOST received by the bridge forms the corresponding reserve. The principal research problem is making that native reserve non-discretionary and safely redeemable.
The reserve can have no key at all — no daemon, no multisig, no guardians. That needs exactly two new SOST consensus rules (keyless reserve outputs + SOST verifying Ethereum finality) and one Ethereum-side component (a SOST header relay). With them, the reserve and the vault each check proofs from the other chain, so the hashlock is no longer what protects the reserve: hashed swaps stay only as an optional fast path for market makers using their own funds. Research only; not implemented; not in V17. See Diagram 7b.
SOST is not planning to launch two bridges. The lock/mint model below is shown only to explain the difference; its prototype code is the source of reusable components.
| Principle | SOST Atomic Bridge |
|---|---|
| wSOST issuance | preissued once, immobilized in the Ethereum Atomic Vault; no mint per operation |
| Return | returned wSOST goes back to the immobilized inventory; no burn required |
| Native SOST | held in the native reserve; never burned |
| Exchange | HTLC atomic swaps in both directions, one shared sha256 secret per swap (the native SOST HTLC is active on mainnet since #16,000). C705: for a keyless reserve, the swap is settled by cross-chain proofs instead (Diagram 7b) |
| Backing rule | CIRCULATING_wSOST ≤ CONFIRMED_NATIVE_SOST_RESERVE — not totalSupply |
| Liquidity pool / human approval | none / none per operation (automatic engine) |
| Gold Access Key | separate: XAUT straight to Gold Reserve V2; not part of the 1:1 |
H · refund to user after ≈48 hH = sha256(s)the user knows s; claiming wSOST reveals it; the same s lets the reserve claim the SOSTH · beneficiary fixed = user · back to inventory after ≈12 hs locally and opens a request bound to H = sha256(s), the amount and your Ethereum address. The Gold Access Key in XAUT is escrowed in the same Ethereum transaction — if you lack XAUT, it fails here, before any SOST moves.H, claimable by the reserve, refundable to you after ≈288 blocks.H, payable only to you.s: the wSOST reach you and the escrowed XAUT goes to Gold Reserve V2, in one transaction.s to claim your 1,000 SOST into the native reserve.Step 4 must not happen for a SOST lock that does not exist — otherwise anyone could collect wSOST with their own secret. So Ethereum still needs to know the SOST lock is real: today through the engine's authorization (which can be a threshold of keys), later possibly through a SOST light client. The atomic swap turns “mint authority” into “release-from-inventory authority”: the damage of a compromised verifier is bounded by the inventory and the caps, not removed.
H' · beneficiary fixed = vault · refund to user after ≈48 hH' = sha256(s')claiming the SOST reveals s'; anyone can then return the 500 wSOST to the vaultH' · claimable by you · back to reserve after ≈72 blocksNo burn, no XAUT on the return. SOST does not need to verify an Ethereum burn — but the reserve signers still decide, off-chain, to fund the SOST HTLC only after they see a final Ethereum lock. That decision is the custody problem (Diagram 7).
| Entry +1,000 | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| SOST reserve | 10,000 | 11,000 |
| wSOST circulating | 10,000 | 11,000 |
| wSOST in vault | 990,000 | 989,000 |
| backing | 100% | 100% |
| Exit −500 | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| SOST reserve | 10,000 | 9,500 |
| wSOST circulating | 10,000 | 9,500 |
| wSOST in vault | 990,000 | 990,500 |
| backing | 100% | 100% |
CIRCULATING_wSOST ≤ CONFIRMED_NATIVE_SOST_RESERVE, with equality after every completed operation — never totalSupply(wSOST) ≤ locked SOST. Tracked separately: TOTAL PREMINTED · VAULT INVENTORY · PENDING (inside HTLCs) · CIRCULATING · NATIVE BACKING · PENDING NATIVE. A large inventory is itself a target, so it would be sized to the exposure caps and topped up in tranches; the 1,000,000 figure is illustrative.The side that moves first gets the longer deadline, so the other side always has time to react. Exit mirrors it: your wSOST HTLC ≈48 h, the reserve's SOST HTLC ≈72 blocks (≈12 h).
| What goes wrong | Outcome |
|---|---|
| Not enough XAUT | fails when you open the request; no SOST is locked |
| The vault never releases (engine stopped, paused) | you refund your SOST after the deadline; the XAUT escrow returns |
| You never claim the wSOST | the vault HTLC returns to inventory (anyone can trigger it); you refund your SOST; XAUT returns |
| Exit: the reserve never funds | you refund your wSOST after the deadline |
| Exit: you never claim the SOST | the reserve HTLC returns to the reserve; you refund your wSOST |
| Same secret used twice | refused: every hashlock and swap id is single-use |
| Two exits at the same time | each uses distinct reserve outputs; the engine serializes reserve spending |
| You claim wSOST, the reserve fails to claim the SOST before 48 h | open risk: you could refund the SOST and keep the wSOST → under-backing. Today only the reserve's claim key can claim a SOST HTLC, so watchtowers cannot help. |
| The SOST chain reorganizes after the vault released | bounded risk: the vault HTLC cannot be cancelled without breaking atomicity; protection is depth (30 confirmations) plus a security hold |
If the XAUT payment were collected inside the claim and the claim reverted, the secret s would still be public on-chain and the reserve could claim the SOST although you received nothing. That is why the Gold Access Key is escrowed first and the claim itself has no other condition: anyone holding s can submit it, and the wSOST can only go to you.
An atomic swap coordinates the exchange. It does not decide who controls the SOST afterwards. A daemon that holds a private key is still an automated custodian.
Honest status: with today's and V17's primitives, arbitrary withdrawal by whoever holds the reserve key (or 3 of 5 signers) is not impossible. Only the keyless level L4 removes it, and it needs a consensus upgrade that is not authorized; the SOST consensus is unchanged.
| What moves | Only when | Paid to |
|---|---|---|
| Deposit box → reserve | proof that the vault released your wSOST | the reserve |
| Deposit box → you | proof that the entry was cancelled (deadline passed) | your refund address, fixed in the box |
| Reserve → you | proof that you returned wSOST (one-time exit number) | the SOST address you gave the vault |
| Reserve → anyone else | never — no key, no admin, no vote | — |
Bounded model check (all orders of events with users, relayers and an attacker): reserve with a key or a multisig → can be taken; keyless rules → no tested sequence loses or duplicates coins, and every user can finish or cancel even if all servers disappear. Strong evidence, not a formal proof. Both rules are a hard fork: not in V17, candidate for V18.
Return: burn wSOST → verify the burn → release SOST. locked SOST = circulating wSOST; totalSupply changes every time.
Return: reverse swap; wSOST goes back to the inventory. totalSupply fixed; circulating changes.
There is no single vault that lives on both chains at once: there are two states on two chains, and a mechanism that must connect them safely.
| Property | Model A · lock / mint | Model B · SOST Atomic Bridge |
|---|---|---|
| Entry | lock + mint | swap + release from inventory |
| Exit | burn + release | return to inventory + release |
| wSOST total supply | variable | fixed after premint |
| Circulating supply | variable | variable |
| Premint required | no | yes |
| Native reserve | yes | yes |
| Atomic swaps central | no | yes |
| Mint authority risk | yes — unbounded except by caps | changed: release authority, bounded by the inventory and the caps |
| Native vault risk | yes | yes |
| Automatic return | possible | design objective (permissionless settlement on Ethereum) |
| Liquidity pool | no | no |
| Human operator per operation | goal: no | goal: no |
| Trustless today | no | no |
| Production ready | no | no |
Like SOST: UTXO chain, vault, atomic settlement, withdrawals tied to UTXO state, less reliance on custodial signers. Unlike: Atomiq verifies Bitcoin PoW on the destination chain and releases LP liquidity; SOST uses preissued wSOST and 1:1 native reserve accounting, and has no SOST light client yet.
Native assets, no wrapping — but it relies on a dedicated validator set and pools. Not equivalent to the SOST design.
Solves vault control with a dedicated validator network — the opposite approach to a light client of the source chain.
Aims to avoid a separate validator network for every conversion. Not claimed to be more secure, more advanced or novel.
| Atomiq | THORChain | Chainflip | SOST Atomic Bridge | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Source-chain verification | on-chain light client | validators witness | validators witness | engine today; light client = research |
| Vault control | verified UTXO transactions | TSS validator set | aggregate key, 100/150 | cold key → V17 3-of-5 → ? |
| Liquidity | LPs | pools | JIT AMM | none (inventory) |
| Separate validator network | no | yes | yes | no |
It is a research question, not a plan. ConvergenceX has a compact transcript proof that a node checks in about 10–20 ms without the 4 GB dataset, so a light client is not ruled out — but reproducing it and the cASERT difficulty rules in the EVM has not been measured and is expected to be expensive; an optimistic header relay with a challenge window is the likelier first step. In the Atomic Bridge, proofs would no longer be needed for every exchange; their role would be the entry release, public reserve verification, settlement checks, reorg detection and recovery.
Sources: Atomiq · UTXO-controlled vault; Atomiq · Bitcoin light client; Chainflip · protocol overview; THORChain · Bifröst, TSS and vaults. Parameters of other systems change over time.
Receives every Gold Access Key: escrowed from your wallet when you open the request, paid when you claim your wSOST. It issues nothing, allows no arbitrary withdrawal and provides no liquidity. NOT DEPLOYED NO FUNDS
The gold of the reserve is restricted external ecosystem wealth. It gives no individual right of redemption and does not guarantee the price of SOST.
feeEUR = min(250, max(0.50, bridgeValueEUR × 0.001)) · feeXAUT = feeEUR / XAUT price, rounded up to XAUT's 6 decimals (verified on the official XAUT contract). Minimum operation 100 EUR. Paid in XAUT, 100% to Gold Reserve V2. Ethereum gas is separate and paid by you. The return wSOST → SOST has no XAUT fee. Not free, and never presented as free.| Bridge value | Contribution to the reserve (EUR) | XAUT (6 dp, rounded up) | Effective rate | Ethereum gas | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 EUR | — | — | — | — | NOT AVAILABLE · BELOW MINIMUM |
| 10 EUR | — | — | — | — | NOT AVAILABLE · BELOW MINIMUM |
| 50 EUR | — | — | — | — | NOT AVAILABLE · BELOW MINIMUM |
| 100 EUR | 0.50 | 0.000135 | 0.50% | separate, paid in ETH | allowed (minimum fee) |
| 250 EUR | 0.50 | 0.000135 | 0.20% | separate, paid in ETH | allowed (minimum fee) |
| 500 EUR | 0.50 | 0.000135 | 0.10% | separate, paid in ETH | allowed |
| 750 EUR | 0.75 | 0.000202 | 0.10% | separate, paid in ETH | allowed |
| 1,000 EUR | 1.00 | 0.000270 | 0.10% | separate, paid in ETH | allowed |
| 1,500 EUR | 1.50 | 0.000404 | 0.10% | separate, paid in ETH | allowed |
| 2,000 EUR | 2.00 | 0.000539 | 0.10% | separate, paid in ETH | allowed |
| 3,000 EUR | 3.00 | 0.000808 | 0.10% | separate, paid in ETH | allowed |
| 5,000 EUR | 5.00 | 0.001347 | 0.10% | separate, paid in ETH | allowed |
| 7,500 EUR | 7.50 | 0.002020 | 0.10% | separate, paid in ETH | allowed |
| 10,000 EUR | 10.00 | 0.002694 | 0.10% | separate, paid in ETH | allowed |
| 15,000 EUR | 15.00 | 0.004040 | 0.10% | separate, paid in ETH | allowed |
| 25,000 EUR | 25.00 | 0.006733 | 0.10% | separate, paid in ETH | allowed |
| 50,000 EUR | 50.00 | 0.013466 | 0.10% | separate, paid in ETH | allowed |
| 100,000 EUR | 100.00 | 0.026932 | 0.10% | separate, paid in ETH | allowed |
| 500,000 EUR | 250.00 | 0.067329 | 0.05% | separate, paid in ETH | allowed (maximum fee) |
| 1,000,000 EUR | 250.00 | 0.067329 | 0.025% | separate, paid in ETH | allowed (maximum fee) |
sost1… address.C701:0x<request id> and checks the vault address, the exact amount, the request, the Ethereum recipient, 30 confirmations, that the output is unspent and never used before. Only then it signs one EIP-712 authorization.Every conversion moves through these states. The names in the first column are the design names; the prototype uses the names in the second.
| Design state | Prototype state | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| CREATED | REQUEST_CREATED | request id bound to recipient, amount, chains, contract, expiry |
| WAITING_SOST | AWAITING_SOST | waiting for the deposit with the request's capsule |
| SOST_SEEN · CONFIRMING | VERIFYING | deposit found; counting confirmations and checking every field |
| SOST_FINAL | DEPOSIT_CONFIRMED | 30 confirmations, output unspent, never used |
| AUTHORIZED | AUTH_READY | one EIP-712 authorization, valid 30 minutes |
| WAITING_ETHEREUM | AWAITING_METAMASK | waiting for the user's single Ethereum transaction |
| MINTED | MINTING | XAUT → Gold Reserve V2 and wSOST → user in one transaction |
| COMPLETED | COMPLETED | both transaction ids published |
| EXPIRED | EXPIRED | no deposit before the request expired: nothing to recover |
| PAUSED | (minting paused by reconciliation or a pauser) | no new mints; burns and releases continue |
| RECOVERY_PENDING · REFUND_ELIGIBLE | PENDING_RECOVERY | deposit that cannot be minted (mismatch, no capsule, expiry) |
| REFUNDED | REFUND_PREPARED → REFUNDED | request revoked on Ethereum first, then the SOST are returned |
| SECURITY_HOLD | SECURITY_ERROR | reorg after authorization or an inconsistency: the engine stops |
The Atomic Bridge versions of these flows are in Diagram 2 (entry), Diagram 3 (exit) and Diagram 6 (failures). The Gold Access Key amounts below are the same in both models.
| Who | Value (example) | Gold Access Key | XAUT | Effective | Receives |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Luis, first conversion | 100 EUR | 0.50 EUR (minimum) | 0.000135 | 0.50% | same SOST amount in wSOST |
| Carlos | 10,000 EUR | 10.00 EUR | 0.002694 | 0.10% | same SOST amount in wSOST |
| Marta | 25,000 EUR | 25.00 EUR | 0.006733 | 0.10% | same SOST amount in wSOST |
| A fund | 1,000,000 EUR | 250.00 EUR (maximum — the cap applies from 250,000 EUR) | 0.067329 | 0.025% | same SOST amount in wSOST |
| Pablo | 60 EUR | — | — | — | REFUSED · below 100 EUR (refused before any deposit) |
| Situation | What the bridge does | The user's money |
|---|---|---|
| SOST sent, but the Ethereum step is never executed | PENDING: the authorization expires after 30 min; a new one can be issued for the same deposit, or the user asks for a refund | the SOST stay locked for that request; nothing is minted |
| Not enough XAUT for the Gold Access Key | the Ethereum transaction reverts as a whole: no XAUT moves and no wSOST is minted; the user tops up XAUT and retries | SOST locked; only the gas of the failed attempt is spent |
| Not enough ETH for gas | MetaMask refuses to send; nothing happens on Ethereum | SOST locked; retry when ETH is available |
| Price quote expired | the contract refuses a stale quote; the engine issues a fresh quote | SOST locked; the new XAUT amount is shown before signing |
| Ethereum congested / transaction reverted | a reverted transaction changes nothing; the user resubmits with a higher fee or later | SOST locked; nothing minted |
| Ana sent 990 SOST instead of 1,000 | amount mismatch → PENDING RECOVERY; no mint | refund of the 990 SOST to the sending address, after the request is revoked on Ethereum |
| Someone tries to reuse Ana's deposit | refused: each deposit (txid, vout) can be consumed once, checked on-chain; a pasted hash is only a lookup key | untouched |
| The SOST chain reorganizes after authorization | SECURITY HOLD: the engine stops issuing authorizations and the case is reviewed | no wSOST without a final deposit |
| The verification service is offline | no authorizations are issued; on restart it re-reads the chain and continues | locked SOST stay locked; burns keep working |
| wSOST burned, SOST not yet released | the burn is recorded on Ethereum with its release id; the release is pending until signed and recorded | the obligation is public and counted as outstanding |
| Locked SOST and wSOST supply ever disagree | reconciliation pauses minting automatically | returns (burn → release) stay available |
An illustrative month with 300 completed conversions:
| Operations | Value each (example) | Key each | XAUT each | XAUT to the reserve |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 200 | 1,000 EUR | 1.00 EUR | 0.000270 | 0.054000 |
| 80 | 10,000 EUR | 10.00 EUR | 0.002694 | 0.215520 |
| 18 | 50,000 EUR | 50.00 EUR | 0.013466 | 0.242388 |
| 2 | 1,000,000 EUR | 250.00 EUR | 0.067329 | 0.134658 |
| 300 | 3,900,000 EUR bridged | 2,400 EUR | — | 0.646566 XAUT (≈ 2,400 EUR at the demo price) |
The reserve grows only with real use of the bridge. The gold stays in the reserve under its own rules: it is not paid out to anyone, it backs neither SOST nor wSOST, and it gives no holder a redemption right. Growth of the reserve does not guarantee any price of SOST.
| Historical Gold Vault | Gold Reserve V2 | |
|---|---|---|
| Where | SOST chain (consensus) | Ethereum (smart contract) |
| Holds | SOST from blocks 0–24,999 (25% of each block) | tokenized gold (XAUT) only |
| Fed by | nothing since #25,000 (0% of new emission) | the Gold Access Key of each completed bridge operation (+ voluntary contributions) |
| Used for | frozen by consensus; pays the DTD Jackpot | held; no liquidity, no arbitrary withdrawal, emergency rules only |
| Status | LIVE · FROZEN | NOT DEPLOYED |
Most cross-chain bridges belong to one of five families. They differ in who decides that a deposit is real, where the money for the other side comes from, and who keeps the fee.
| Custodian / multisig | Liquidity network | Guardian / messaging | Issuer burn-mint | Rollup / light client | SOST Atomic Bridge (target) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Example | WBTC, Ronin, Horizon | Stargate, Across, Hop | Wormhole, LayerZero | Circle CCTP | Optimism Standard Bridge | SOST ↔ wSOST (target) |
| Trust assumption | custodian or N-of-M key holders | pool and relayer contracts; relayers are repaid | an external guardian / verifier set | the issuer | the destination chain verifies the source chain | target (C705): each chain verifies the other — SOST proof of work for deposits, Ethereum’s sync committee for returns; no key holder |
| External operators | custodian, signers | relayers, LPs | guardians / verifiers | issuer | none beyond the chains (proposers, challengers) | none: no outside federation, no validator network |
| Liquidity requirement | no | yes — pools on each side | no (wrapped) / yes (some routes) | no | no | no |
| Capital requirement | custody of the originals | LP and relayer capital | none for wrapping | none | none | none: a preissued wSOST inventory, released only against SOST received |
| Amount received | 1:1 minus fees | amount minus fees; may vary with pool balance | 1:1 minus fees | 1:1 | 1:1 | exactly 1:1; the contribution is paid apart in XAUT |
| Fee structure | custodian / merchant fees | LP + relayer (+ rebalancing) fees, variable by route | messaging / relayer fees | destination gas | gas | Gold Access Key 0.10% (min 0.50, max 250 EUR) → 100% to Gold Reserve V2; return free of it |
| Finality | custodian’s policy | relayer fills fast; settles later | guardian finality policy | issuer attestation | challenge window (e.g. 7 days to withdraw on the Optimism Standard Bridge) | 30 SOST confirmations / Ethereum finality (≈13 min); one entry deadline on Ethereum |
| Recovery | custodian process | slow fill by LP capital; refunds | manual redeem / governance | issuer | forced withdrawal through the source chain | anyone cancels after the deadline; the deposit refunds to its fixed address |
| User types a tx hash? | sometimes | no | sometimes (manual redeem) | no | no | no — the wallet or any relayer carries the proofs |
| Security model / main risk | key holders | pool / relayer contracts | guardian keys, verification bugs | the issuer | proof system, long exit | a very deep SOST reorg (concentrated mining → capped amounts), the sync committee, code correctness |
| Status | in production on their networks | DESIGN · NOT ACTIVE | ||||
No model is universally better: each trades trust, capital, speed and cost differently. Light-client and rollup bridges minimize trust but need one chain to verify the other; liquidity networks are fast but need capital; issuer bridges work only for the issuer’s own token. The SOST Atomic Bridge avoids capital, pools and outside operators at the price of an engine-authorized entry release and an unsolved native custody problem.
Sources: Across documentation (fees); Stargate documentation (protocol fees); Wormhole, Circle CCTP and Optimism documentation; public post-mortems of the Ronin, Harmony Horizon and Wormhole incidents. Other bridges change over time; descriptions are for orientation only.
wSOST is not another coin. It is a token on Ethereum that represents native SOST one-for-one. The SOST it represents stays on the SOST blockchain, locked in a dedicated Bridge Vault, until the wSOST is turned back into SOST.
The deposit carries a capsule (a data field active on SOST since block 7,350) with the id of your bridge request. That id is a public hash of the Ethereum recipient, the amount, the chain and the bridge contract, so your SOST signature binds the deposit to exactly that request. No consensus change, no new transaction type.
Integrating a brand-new Layer-1 is real work for wallets and exchanges; Ethereum and ERC-20 tokens are already integrated almost everywhere. wSOST would make SOST reachable from:
One practical barrier to wider SOST market access is the technical burden a centralized exchange faces when it integrates a new, independent Layer-1 blockchain. Listing native SOST would require the exchange to:
Ethereum and ERC-20 infrastructure, on the other hand, is already in place at virtually every major centralized exchange: deposits, withdrawals, custody and monitoring for ERC-20 tokens are standard operations there. For such a venue, integrating an ERC-20 representation is operationally much simpler than integrating a new chain.
The initial exchange-access target is wSOST: the representation offered to CEX and DEX venues where integrating the native SOST chain is impractical or unnecessarily complex. wSOST does not replace SOST. wSOST is designed to make SOST easier to integrate without replacing the native SOST network.
Native SOST remains the canonical protocol asset. wSOST is the planned Ethereum-compatible market-access representation. Gold Reserve V2 is the planned external gold-reserve layer.
The original SOST design introduced a Gold Vault concept from Genesis: part of the early block distribution accumulated in a constitutional reserve, with the long-term idea of connecting SOST with an external gold reserve. That historical architecture later changed. From block #25,000:
wSOST and Gold Reserve V2 live on the same Ethereum infrastructure as tokenized gold such as XAUT. In the C701 design the reserve grows from one source only: the Gold Access Key each bridge user contributes in XAUT, paid straight from the user's wallet to the reserve inside the mint transaction.
That gives the Genesis reserve philosophy a practical modern infrastructure — SOST L1 + the wSOST access layer + an external tokenized-gold reserve — while every accounting layer stays separate. DEVELOPMENT · NOT DEPLOYED
Nothing below can be done today. It describes the C701 conventional lock/mint prototype (automated verification) — no longer the target architecture — prototyped and tested on a local development chain only. Design in development · not active · not ready for production.
A transaction hash typed by a user is only used to search or recover; it is never treated as proof. The engine always re-reads the SOST chain.
| Action | Cost |
|---|---|
| Deposit (SOST side) | the normal SOST network fee of your transaction |
| Mint (Ethereum) | Gold Access Key in XAUT (0.10%, min 0.50 EUR, max 250 EUR, 100% to Gold Reserve V2) + Ethereum gas paid by you in ETH |
| Send wSOST, use a DEX | Ethereum gas only |
| Return (wSOST → SOST) | Ethereum gas for the burn + the published SOST network fee of the release. No XAUT. |
All costs are shown before you confirm. Nothing about the bridge is free, and it is never described as free.
You need an Ethereum wallet that can sign the mint transaction and hold XAUT and a little ETH for gas: MetaMask, Rabby, a hardware wallet or any EVM wallet. The wSOST recipient can be another address, but only one you control or one that explicitly supports wSOST.
An exchange that supports the wSOST ERC-20 does not have to integrate the SOST chain first, and anyone who holds wSOST — including wSOST bought on an exchange — can use the return path. Only send wSOST to an exchange that explicitly supports wSOST deposits; tokens sent to an address that does not credit them can be lost.
So, once the bridge is liquid and freely usable, the wSOST market price is expected to become a market reference for native SOST. Prices are not guaranteed identical: bridge risk, fees, liquidity, access restrictions and finality delays can create temporary premiums or discounts. A large, persistent gap would mean wrapping is not freely available or the bridge is impaired.
| # | Source | What it means | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Monetary scarcity | Hard cap 4,669,201 SOST, smooth decaying emission | LIVE |
| 2 | PoW network security | ConvergenceX Proof of Work, nodes verifying every rule | LIVE |
| 3 | Utility | DTD, Jackpot V2, capsules, atomic swaps, future native assets | LIVE PARTLY GATED |
| 4 | Market access & liquidity | wSOST on Ethereum, DEX pools, exchange integration | RESEARCH |
| 5 | External Gold Reserve V2 | Publicly verifiable tokenized gold held by the ecosystem | RESEARCH |
The Genesis Gold Vault is the conceptual ancestor of Gold Reserve V2 — a rule-bound reserve with one purpose and public accounting — but it is not the same reserve. It accumulated SOST; Gold Reserve V2 would hold tokenized gold. Historical Gold Vault ≠ Gold Reserve V2.
A new, external reserve on Ethereum. It receives tokenized gold — not newly emitted SOST — and it never mints wSOST. In the C701 design it is funded by the Gold Access Key of completed bridge operations (plus voluntary contributions); its balance and every deposit are verifiable on Ethereum, and it provides no liquidity.
| Asset | Role | Status |
|---|---|---|
| XAUT (Tether Gold) | initial intended asset | RESEARCH |
| PAXG (Paxos Gold) | possible later asset; reportedly not offered in the EU | GATED UNTIL LEGAL / AVAILABILITY REVIEW |
A proposed use for the XAUT collected by the Gold Access Key: periodically buy wSOST back from the market and take the same amount of native SOST out of circulation forever. Ordinary users of the SOST Atomic Bridge are not affected: entering and leaving keep working exactly as described above (wSOST from and back to the inventory, no mint, no burn).
Option A keeps the founding rule of the SOST Atomic Bridge: wSOST is issued once and its total supply never changes. The retired wSOST still exist on Ethereum, but they sit in a contract with no way out, and they are counted separately from the ordinary inventory. (Option B — really burning them and reducing totalSupply() — was considered and not chosen.)
| Account | Before | After retiring 10,000 |
|---|---|---|
| A · wSOST total supply | 1,000,000 | 1,000,000 (unchanged) |
| B · wSOST in the ordinary inventory | 950,000 | 950,000 |
| C · wSOST circulating | 50,000 | 40,000 |
| D · wSOST in the retired inventory (no exit) | 0 | 10,000 |
| E · native SOST in the bridge reserve | 50,000 | 40,000 |
| F · native SOST in the Dead Vault (no exit) | 0 | 10,000 |
| Backing of circulating wSOST (E / C) | 100% | 100% |
| SOST ever mined / SOST destroyed | unchanged / 0 | unchanged / 0 |
The order is fixed: first the wSOST are final in the retired inventory, then the native SOST move. If the second step is delayed, what remains is a public, pending obligation to immobilize — never wSOST circulating without backing.
OUT_PERMANENT_RESERVE) that nodes refuse to spend · accepts deposits only · every entry public and verifiableThe Dead Vault immobilizes SOST, it does not burn it: the emission schedule and the 4,669,201 hard cap are untouched. An address “with no known key” would not give the same guarantee, which is why it needs a consensus rule.
| Piece | Status |
|---|---|
| Retired-inventory contract on Ethereum | RESEARCH new Solidity, not written |
| Permissionless, capped buyback (DEX / auction / tranches) | RESEARCH needs real wSOST liquidity, which does not exist |
| Dead Vault output type on SOST | HARD FORK AFTER V17 not part of #40,000 |
| SOST verifying, by itself, that the wSOST were retired on Ethereum | RESEARCH same open problem as the keyless reserve (C705) |
| SOST Atomic Bridge itself | NOT BUILT PoPR cannot exist before it |
En pocas palabras. Con el XAUT de la Gold Access Key se recomprarían wSOST periódicamente. Esos wSOST quedarían en un inventario retirado del que nunca pueden salir, y la misma cantidad exacta de SOST nativos pasaría a una bóveda sin clave ni salida: 1 wSOST retirado = 1 SOST inmovilizado. Los intercambios normales del puente no cambian, no se emite ni se quema nada y la emisión de SOST queda intacta. Es investigación: necesita el puente atómico y un hard fork posterior a V17, no está activo y no garantiza ningún precio.
Earlier versions of this page described the treasury Gold → wSOST desk and a federated observer architecture. They were never operational and are not the target architecture; C701 replaced them with automated verification, and on 26 Oct 2026 the target became the SOST Atomic Bridge. They are listed here so the history stays readable.
| Historical / superseded design | Proposed in C701 (design in development, not active) |
|---|---|
| Gold → wSOST desk: selling existing treasury wSOST for XAUT at an auction / TWAP price | No treasury sale. Gold Reserve V2 is funded only by the Gold Access Key of bridge operations (and voluntary contributions). |
| 2-of-3 federated observers signing attestations, relayer paying the mint gas | C701 (now the conventional reference): automated verification by an operator-run engine with an EIP-712 authorization; the user sends the mint transaction and pays gas. The centralisation and the single-verifier-key risk are stated openly (see Trust model and Open blockers). |
Deposit capsule WSOST:0x<recipient> | Capsule C701:0x<request id> binding recipient, amount, chain and contract. |
CIRCULATING_WSOST <= CONFIRMED_NATIVE_SOST_RESERVE (the conventional prototype states it as MINTED_WSOST <= VERIFIED_CONFIRMED_NATIVE_SOST_LOCKED), and the system must fail closed (no release) whenever it cannot be demonstrated. No arbitrary withdrawal from the native reserve may be possible. Neither is met yet.| Control | What it does |
|---|---|
| Bound authorization | EIP-712 signature tied to chain id, contract, recipient, amount, deposit txid:vout, expiry and nonce. Changing any field invalidates it. |
| No replay, no double mint | each deposit, request and nonce can be used once; checked on-chain |
| Separate keys | mint authorizer ≠ price signer ≠ administrator; the SOST Bridge Vault key never exists on Ethereum; Gold Reserve V2 guardians have no bridge role |
| Exposure limits | per-operation, daily and total-supply caps |
| Signed, fresh, bounded price | stale, out-of-range or jumping XAUT prices are refused; with no approved SOST/EUR valuation every mint is refused |
| Finality | 30 SOST confirmations (provisional; a 1-block reorg was observed at #30,297); reorgs after authorization stop the engine |
| Reconciliation | locked SOST vs wSOST supply + pending releases; CRITICAL pauses minting automatically; burns keep working |
| Refund guard | a refund needs the deposit to be revoked on Ethereum first, so nobody can keep both the refund and wSOST |
| Timelocked configuration | key or limit changes wait 2 days |
SOST native multisig is not active (library code; planned for V17). The Bridge Vault could therefore only be a single cold key with offline signing, and releases would not be automatic. Deployment is blocked until custody can guarantee a safe, tested recovery.
| # | Open blocker | State |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Non-discretionary native reserve: no arbitrary withdrawal by its signers (missing primitives P1–P5) | OPEN |
| 2 | Entry release authority: a stolen verifier key must not release unbacked wSOST (threshold / light-client research) | OPEN |
| 3 | Entry claim liveness: the reserve must always claim the SOST before the user's deadline | OPEN |
| 4 | Secure native custody with V17 multisig (3-of-5 target) | OPEN |
| 5 | Testnet proof of concept (entry, exit, refunds, replay, reorg, concurrency, theft attempt) | NOT STARTED |
| 6 | Approved SOST/EUR valuation method | OPEN |
| 7 | Reliable XAUT price oracle | OPEN |
| 8 | External security audit | OPEN |
| 9 | Legal / regulatory review | OPEN |
The SOST Atomic Swap is a separate peer-to-peer service. It does not offer SOST ↔ wSOST, charges no Gold Access Key and does not use Gold Reserve V2. The SOST Atomic Bridge would use the same native HTLC primitive, but against the bridge’s own wSOST inventory and native reserve; the two services stay separate.
| Atomic Swap piece | State |
|---|---|
| SOST-side HTLC | LIVE consensus since #16,000 |
| EVM HTLC contract | CODE COMPLETE NOT DEPLOYED |
| BTC side | lab-verified on a development branch · DISABLED ON MAINNET |
| SOST ↔ wSOST pair | NOT OFFERED — that is the bridge's job |
The basic invariant is wSOST.totalSupply ≤ confirmed native SOST backing. That inequality is necessary but not sufficient: a deposit minted twice and a release paid twice can cancel out in the balance. So the indexer reconciles every deposit id, mint, burn and release separately. The SOST side is derived from the SOST chain; the Ethereum side from Ethereum; the browser is never the source of truth.
A failure is shown, never hidden. Transfers of existing wSOST continue while minting is paused.
withdraw(address) and no equivalent unrestricted destination. The reserve can never go to a founder wallet, a guardian wallet, an arbitrary wallet, an exchange deposit or a treasury account.| Power | Who | Effect |
|---|---|---|
| PAUSE | 2-of-5 guardians | stops relevant reserve operations. Pause does not move gold. Stolen pause keys can only stop the safe. |
| CRITICAL RESCUE | 4-of-5 guardians, short timelock | Gold Reserve → the predefined Quarantine Vault only, which itself has no withdrawal. Temporary safe custody, not a final migration. |
| FINAL MIGRATION | all four keys at once (below) | moves assets only to the exact successor vault in the frozen proposal |
| Guardian recovery | 4-of-5 guardians + timelock; any 2 can cancel | replaces a lost or compromised guardian; cannot move assets or change thresholds DEVELOPMENT |
| Guardians | SOST vote | Destination | Timelock | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4/5 ✓ | 8/12 ✓ | approved successor ✓ | done ✓ | MIGRATES |
| 5/5 ✓ | 7/12 ✗ | approved successor ✓ | — | DOES NOT MOVE |
| 4/5 ✓ | 10/12 ✓ | personal wallet ✗ | — | DOES NOT MOVE |
| 4/5 ✓ | 10/12 ✓ | approved successor ✓ | running ✗ | NOT YET |
Miners do not vote on "should we move the gold?" — they vote on one exact instruction. If any material field changes, the old vote is invalid and a new proposal and a new vote are required.
| Check | Rule (frozen at the snapshot) |
|---|---|
| Mining identity | valid SbPoW mining identity with the required recent mining activity |
| NODE_BIND | active binding of that identity to a node key |
| Heartbeats | required heartbeat participation (the Jackpot V2 framework) |
| Snapshot | eligibility is fixed at SNAPSHOT_HEIGHT; a later NODE_BIND or later mining does not enter that proposal |
| Binding age | a minimum NODE_BIND age before the snapshot — value under research |
The vote is a normal SOST transaction from the eligible identity to itself, carrying the choice in a capsule (28 of the verified 80 bytes). Because it spends from that identity, chain validation itself proves control of the private key — no new message-signing tool is needed. The website never asks for a private key, seed phrase, wallet file or password, and it does not run a central poll: the votes are on the SOST blockchain, and anyone can recount them.
| Rule | Exact definition |
|---|---|
| Valid vote | all inputs spend from the identity; the capsule output pays the same identity; text exactly SOSTGOV1|<proposal>|S<snapshot>|YES|NO|ABSTAIN; confirmed in (snapshot, close] |
| Changing a vote | allowed — the last valid confirmed vote before VOTING_CLOSE counts; earlier votes stay on chain |
| Approval | YES ≥ ceil(2/3 × TOTAL FIXED ELIGIBLE CENSUS) — not 2/3 of those who voted |
| ABSTAIN | recorded as participation; never counts as YES |
| Finality | VOTING CLOSED → FINALITY PENDING → FINAL RESULT once the close block is buried by the governance finality depth |
| Phase | Meaning |
|---|---|
| A — Advisory | votes run, are public and verifiable, but do not control a vault. The network is small today (very few eligible identities); calling that "the community" would not be honest. |
| B — Binding | only after an objective, persistent participation condition is met. Maturity criteria under research — no threshold is set without simulation. A UI existing does not make governance binding. |
No proposal is open, so this checks your mining identity against the current Jackpot V2 participation framework — the base of the planned voter census — using the chain-derived participation index. Binding age is still under research.
If a future wallet integration exists, it would build the vote transaction locally. This page never collects keys.
wSOST, Gold Reserve V2 and governance are part of this research horizon. Unlike the 80/15/5 scenario, they need no SOST consensus change: they would run on Ethereum and on existing SOST capsules, behind their own engineering, audit and legal gates.
One Proof of Work, two control dials. ConvergenceX defines the work of every attempt. bitsQ sets how rare a winning commit must be (every block; 288-block average; ±15 s dead band; steps 0.5% / 1% / 2% / ≈3.03%). The Equalizer sets how demanding each attempt is (43 profiles E7…B0…H35 from the schedule lag) and never changes bitsQ. Full rules: Technology · comparison with examples: SOST vs Bitcoin vs Ethereum.
| Item | State |
|---|---|
| Block reward 50% miner / 50% DTD | LIVE |
| DTD Jackpot V2 (NODE_BIND + heartbeats) | LIVE |
| Gold Vault 25% / PoPC 25% emission | HISTORICAL (blocks 0–24,999) |
| Gold Vault + PoPC balances | FROZEN · fund the Jackpot |
| "Gold floor" / gold backing per SOST | RETIRED DESIGN |
| Native multisig (sost3) | NOT ACTIVE · library code only · planned for V17 |
| SOST-side HTLC | LIVE (consensus since #16,000) |
| EVM atomic-swap contract | CODE COMPLETE NOT DEPLOYED |
| BTC atomic-swap signing | lab-verified on a development branch · DISABLED ON MAINNET |
| Native assets / Asset Market | DEVELOPER GATED |
| SOST Atomic Bridge (Atomic Reserve Vault) — target | RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT NOT ACTIVE NOT YET PROVEN · design + audit done, proof of concept not started, native custody unsolved, 9 open blockers |
| Conventional lock/mint prototype (C701/C703) | REFERENCE / COMPONENT SOURCE · local tests only (Foundry 87/87, engine 25/25), not deployed |
| Gold Access Key (XAUT) | DEVELOPMENT · blocked: no approved SOST/EUR valuation |
| Gold Reserve V2 | DEVELOPMENT NOT DEPLOYED NO FUNDS |
| Gold → wSOST desk / treasury wSOST sale | HISTORICAL / SUPERSEDED DESIGN · never operational |
| Federated observer network | HISTORICAL / SUPERSEDED DESIGN · never operational |
| SOST Atomic Swap | separate service · not part of the bridge |
| On-chain SOST governance | RESEARCH · advisory first |
| 80 / 15 / 5 reward scenario | RESEARCH · would need a future hard fork |
Signed operator notices, propagated between nodes. Advisory only. Does not affect mining rewards, block validity, chain selection, transaction validation, wallet balances, PoPC, Gold Vault, or consensus.
Each node reads notices.json on startup. ECDSA-SHA256 signature verification against a hardcoded operator pubkey. Failure modes (bad signature, wrong network, expired, malformed) are silent drops. Active at V13_HEIGHT (12,000).
Adds N-of-M threshold signatures (default 3-of-5), revocation by notice ID (only threshold-signed notices can revoke), and an optional mirror_url metadata field (never fetched by the node). Active at V13_HEIGHT.
Nodes gossip verified notices via a BCNN dispatcher with hard limits: 4 KB max notice, 32-notice LRU dedup cache, 8 notices/peer/min rate limit. Bad-signature notices are silently dropped; oversized/malformed/rate-limit hits earn peer misbehavior. Active at V13_HEIGHT.
Hard invariant. No Beacon code path links into block validation, mining validity, or chain commit. Beacon
cannot reject, invalidate, or affect the canonical chain. Rollback is a single-line constant revert
(BEACON_P2P_ACTIVATION_HEIGHT to INT64_MAX in include/sost/params.h).